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WHY UTILITY NON-LINEARLY DEPENDS ON MONEY:
A COMMONSENSE EXPLANATION
Outline.

Human decision making is based on the notion of utility.

Empirical studies have shown that utility non-linearly depends on the
money amount. In this paper, we provide a commonsense explanation
of this empirical fact: namely, that without such non-linearity, we would
not have a correct description of such a commonsense behavior as saving
money for retirement.

Saving money for retirement: a simplied description of the
problem. Let us consider a simplied version of this situation, when we
only have two moments of the time: the current moment of time (when
we earn money), and the future moment of time, in which we will not
earn money.
Suppose that at the present moment, we earn the amount
this amount, we can save

m − s.

s≤m

m.

Out of

and thus, spend the remaining amount

The saved money is invested; as a result, with interest, in the

future, we will have an increased amount
The question is how much money

s ∈ [0, m]

s

k · s,

for some constant

k > 1.

we shall save, i.e., which amount

we should select.

How should we make this decision?

According to the decision

making theory, preferences and decisions by a rational decision maker
are described by utilities of dierent alternatives; see, e.g., [35].
Let us briey recall what is utility and how it is related to decision
making.

Utility: a brief reminder. How can we describe human preferences?
One possibility is to select two theoretically possible alternatives: one
very bad

A− ,

A that we will
A+ , much better than
(A < A+ ).

much worse than any other alternative

ever encounter (A−

< A),

and another very good

anything that we will encounter in practice
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Then, for each number

L(p)

in which we get

probability

1 − p.

A+

p from the interval [0, 1], we can form a lottery
p and A− with the remaining

with probability

A which is in between
A+ : A− < A < A+ . When p = 0, we have L(p) = A− < A;
when p = 1, we have L(p) = A+ > A. Thus, as we increase p from 0
to 1, there should be a threshold value p0 at which A switches for being
better than L(p) to being worse than L(p), i.e., for which, in this sense,
L(p0 ) is equivalent to A: A ∼ L(p0 ).
This threshold value p0 is known as the utility of the alternative A.
This value is usually denoted by u(A), so that A ∼ L(u(A)).
Let us now consider an arbitrary alternative

A−

and

Utility of money. The utility depends on the alternative. In particular,
u
u = M (a).
utility is thus equal to uc =
to uf = M (k · s).

for alternatives consisting of getting a monetary amount, the utility
depends on this amount

a.

Let us denote this dependence by

In the savings situation, the current

M (m − s),

and the future utility is equal

Empirical fact: utility is a non-linear function of money.
Empirical analysis shows that utility non-linearly depends on the money
amount. The corresponding dependence is close to

M (a) =

√
a;

see,

e.g., [12].

Why: a problem.

The question is how can we explain this empirical

fact. Such an explanation  based on the saving situation  is described
in this paper.
Before we proceed with this explanation, we need to dip deeper into
the relation between utility and decision making.

Expected utility: a reminder.

Utility describes the desirability of

each outcome. Our goal, however, is usually not to select an outcome,
but rather to select an action. Usually, we are not 100% sure about
the outcome of each action; each action can lead to dierent possible
outcomes

A1 , . . . , An ,

with dierent probabilities

p1 , . . . , pn .

How do we

describe desirability of such an action?

Ai
A+ with probability
1 − u(Ai ). Thus, the

To describe this desirability, we can use the fact that each outcome
is equivalent to a lottery

u(Ai )

and

A−

L(u(Ai ))

in which we get

with the remaining probability

corresponding action is equivalent to a composite lottery in which we
rst select one of the outcomes

pi ,

Ai

with the corresponding probability

and then, depending on the selected

probabilities

u(Ai )

and

1 − u(Ai ).
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Ai ,

select

A+

or

A−

with the

A+ or A− . The probability
A+ can be computed by using the formula of complete
probability, as p1 · u(A1 ) + . . . + pn · u(An ). Thus, the action is equivalent
to the lottery L(p) with this probability p. By denition of utility, it
means that the utility u of the corresponding action is equal to this
probability p, i.e., that
In this composite lottery, we get either

p

of getting

u = p1 · u(A1 ) + . . . + pn · u(An ).
In mathematical terms, the right-hand side is the expected value of the
utility

u(Ai )

of the outcomes. Thus, the utility of an action is equal to

the expected value of the utility of outcomes.

How unique is utility. The above denition of utility depends on the
A− and A+ . One can check that if instead,
′
′
we select a dierent pair of extreme alternatives A− < A+ , then the
′
resulting utility values u (A) are related to the original values u(A) by a
selection of the alternatives

linear dependence:

a>0

for some
Thus,

u′ (A) = a · u(A) + b,

and

utility

b.

is

dened

modulo

an

arbitrary

increasing

linear

transformation. The numerical value of the utility depends on the choice
of the two auxiliary alternatives

A−

and

A+ .

Thus, it makes sense that

the formulas involving utilities should not change if we simply re-scale
the utilities by using a dierent pair of alternative utilities  i.e., by
applying the appropriate linear re-scaling.

How to take into account future utility.

Let us use the above

invariance argument to describe how a person will make a savings
decision, a decision that aects not only the current situation, but also
the future one.
Let

uc

be the utility of the current situation, and let

utility of a future situation. In the savings case,

uf ≤ uc .

uf

denote the

Dierent possible outcomes can be described by dierent pairs

(uc , uf ).

To describe preferences between outcomes, we need to assign,

to each such pair, a utility value

u

that describes the preference of the

outcome characterized by this pair. Thus, we need to describe a function

u(uc , uf ) that combines the original values uc

and

uf

into a single utility

value.
For this function, the above requirement means that if we re-scale the
utilities

uc

and

uf , then the resulting utility u will be similarly re-scaled,
3

i.e., that for every

a>0

and for every

b,

we have

u(a · uc + b, a · uf + b) = a · u(uc , uf ) + b.
In particular, for

u(uc , uf ) − uc ,

a=1

b = −uc ,

and

this implies that

u(0, uf − uc ) =

i.e., that

u(uc , uf ) = uc + F (uc − uf ),
where we denoted

def

F (x) = u(0, −x).

For this expression, scale-invariance (b

= 0)

implies that

a · uc + F (a · (uc − uf )) = a · (uc + F (uc − uf )) = a · uc + a · F (uc − uf ),
i.e., that
then the

def

F (a · (uc − uf )) = a · F (uc − uf ). If we denote y = uc − uf ,
above equality implies that F (a · y) = a · F (y). For y = 1, this

implies that

F (a) = c · a

for some constant

def

c = F (1).

Thus,

u(uc , uf ) = uc + F (uc − uf ) = uc + c · (uf − uc ) = (1 − c) · uc + c · uf .
So, the resulting utility
For

uc = M (m − s)

u

linearly depends on the utilities

and

uf = M (k · s),

uc

and

uf .

we thus get

u(s) = u(uc (s), uf (s)) = (1 − c) · M (m − s) + c · M (k · s).
We select the saved amount

s

for which this utility value is the largest

possible.

What if utility linearly depends on money amount? If M (a) is a
linear function of

a,

then

u

is a linear function of the saved amount

s.

A linear function attains its largest values on the endpoints. Thus, for
a linear utility function, we end up with one of the the following two
options:

•

the rst option is

s = 0,

when we do not save anything for

retirement at all;

•

the second option is when we save the largest possible amount, i.e.,
the amount for which

uf = M (k · s) = uc = M (m − s);

in other

words, we make sure that our retirement income is 100% of our
original income.

4

This is not how people save for retirement; so, we have an
explanation for the non-linear dependence. In reality, people save
some

money for retirement, but

not

the maximal amount of money: the

retirement income is usually smaller than the original income.
So, in the simplest case of saving for retirement, models is which
utility linearly depends on money amount do not describe the usual
human behavior  which means that the dependence of utility on money
amount should be non-linear.
Thus, we get the desired commonsense explanation of the empirical
non-linearity.
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